The Canadian Red Ensign

The Canadian Red Ensign
Showing posts with label Russell Kirk. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Russell Kirk. Show all posts

Friday, October 5, 2018

More Assorted Reflections

The first Assorted Reflections can be found here.

- Although Oliver Cromwell’s Puritans claimed to be fighting for the freedom of the people against “tyranny”, it was King Charles I who had the love and support of the common people. The Jacobins, likewise, declared themselves to be the champions of the poor of France, even though in the cahiers detailing their grievances the poor of France had not called for the overthrow of the monarchy, Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette were in fact more popular than the men who deposed them, the Revolution was instigated by a cousin of the king, and most of its leaders were upper class intellectuals. Marxism considered itself to be the voice of the proletariat (factory workers) despite the fact that its founders were a pseudo-philosopher (Marx) and a factory owner (Engels), it has always been led by intellectuals, and has never drawn significant support from the actual working classes, who generally suffered the most wherever it came to power. Similarly, the feminist movement appointed itself the voice of the female sex, although it has never spoken for family oriented women who make marriage and children their top priorities and is overtly hostile to Christian women who believe the Sixth Commandment applies to both sexes. The claims of black activist groups to speak for all blacks and of the Anti-Defamation League to speak for Jews are further examples of the same.

- From its beginning feminism has drawn inspiration from both liberalism (classical) and Marxism, with some feminists leaning more toward liberalism, others towards Marxism, but with a general alignment to the liberal-left. The liberal-left has always been inclined towards democratic and small-r republican institutions of government – an inclination which in no way conflicts with its inclination towards totalitarianism. Within such institutions, feminism had to fight for the right of women to vote and to hold elected office. Conversely, we on the conservative-right have traditionally been inclined towards the institution of hereditary, royal, monarchy. This institution has allowed for reigning and even ruling queens and empresses since the dawn of human history.

- Feminism has strange priorities. On New Year’s Eve, 2015, gangs of migrants harassed, assaulted, and in some cases raped large numbers of women in Cologne and other German cities. The feminist outcry over this was insignificant, almost non-existent in comparison to the loud noise they are currently making over Brett Kavanaugh, the charges against whom are unsubstantiated and suspiciously timed. Indeed, most feminists have jumped on the “migrants welcome” and anti-Islamophobia bandwagons, proving that while politics makes strange bedfellows, intersectionality makes the strangest bedfellows of all.


- While I do not take the position that women ought to be kept barefoot, pregnant, and in the kitchen, I do think a case can be made that this is what should be done to feminists. Especially the male feminists.


- It has been reported for a couple of weeks now that Her Excellency, Julie Payette, is less than happy with her position as Her Majesty's vice-regal representative in the Dominion government and that others are less than happy with her performance in that role. Part of the problem, it seems to me, is that she was chosen for the position by the Liberal Party. The Grits, and especially the Trudeau branch of the party, have long lacked both an understanding of and an appreciation for the office of the Governor General and the grand, traditional, institution of royal monarchy it represents. So, when it falls to them to choose the next Governor General, they don't look for the person best suited to represent the Queen in Canada - which is the actual, constitutional, purpose of the office - but for someone to be the face of Canada, as they envision it, which is constantly changing, to the world. There is a simple solution to the problem. I have long maintained that while the Canadian Senate is badly in need of reform, the reform it needs is reform that respects and is consistent with the constitution that the Fathers of Confederation bequeathed to us in 1867. The complete overhaul of the Americanized, Triple-E, model proposed by the old Reform Party is unacceptable. The most necessary reform could be accomplished simply by removing control over who is recommended to be appointed to the Senate from the Prime Minister's office. Having the provinces, rather than the federal government, recommend the appointees to the Senate seats allotted to them would be an obvious way of doing this. Similarly, it should not be the Prime Minister who advises the Queen as to who her representative should be. Indeed, unlike the Senate, in the case of the Governor General's office it was not established in Confederation that the Queen would appoint based on recommendation from the Prime Minister's office, but rather, until the Statute of Westminster the appointment was made on recommendation by the Imperial Privy Council. In the Liberal Version of Canadian history this is regarded as a step forward in the evolution of Canadian nationhood. This is because the Liberal Version falsely superimposes America's story - the story of former colonies forging a new national identity after severing the imperial connection - upon Canada. Canada's true story is the exact opposite of this - the story of Britain's loyal North American colonies, English-speaking Protestant and French-speaking Catholic, coming together to create a new nation that would deliberately retain the connection, that would in time become more familial than imperial. Since so many Canadians do not know our own story, transferring the right of recommendation from the Canadian PMO back to London would not sell in this day and age, but that is not the only option that suggests itself. The Queen's Canadian Privy Council, minus the current Prime Minister and Cabinet, is the appropriate body to make the recommendation.


- Mazo de la Roche, at one time Canada's most popular novelist (she also wrote plays, short stories, and a memoir), had very strong views as to who was qualified to be Governor General. According to her biographer Ronald Hambleton she believed the office should be restricted to the aristocracy and preferably a member of the royal family. De la Roche is buried very close to the grave of Stephen Leacock in the churchyard of St. George the Martyr at Sibbald Point in Sutton, Ontario. Both were traditional Canadian Tories - royalists, who believed in Canada and her British institutions and connection, and were suspicious of American liberal republicanism. With her reverence for nobility and the aristocratic ideal, so obviously on display in her Jalna books, de la Roche was more properly the High Tory. Apart from his royalism and his views of race and sex, Leacock's dissent from egalitarianism was in the direction of individualistic meritocracy. He was, perhaps, the quintessential Canadian Low Tory.


- Canada's British institutions and familial connection have historically been means to the end of preserving Canada's independence from the United States. The reverse is also true, that the cause of maintaining Canada's independence from the United States has been the means to the end of preserving her British institutions and familial connection, valued as goods in themselves. The main weakness of Canadian Toryism, apart from the fear of being seen as too right-wing by the electorate that has led to far too much left-ward drift over the years, is that while it always recognized the first point, it seldom fully grasped the second, which is the more important of the two. John Diefenbaker was an exception to this. John Farthing, whose Freedom Wears a Crown articulated and defended the point, was another. Neither man was properly appreciated by the Conservative Party.


- Conservatives of the nineteenth and twentieth-centuries looked back to the eighteenth century statesman Edmund Burke as their prophet. Ironically. Edmund Burke was a member of the Whig (liberal) Party. There is nothing necessarily wrong with this. The ideas that conservatives most respect in Burke are his defence of the British monarchy and established Church, his condemnation of "armed doctrines", his revision of social contract theory to make the "contract of each particular state" into a "clause in the great primeval contract of eternal society" that is a "partnership between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born," and the local patriotism of his "little platoons," all of which come from his Reflections on the Revolution in France, written late in his career, and which better reflect Tory convictions than those of his own party. Indeed, this sharing of ideas has gone both ways. Thomas Hobbes, who introduced social contract theory to begin with, and David Hume, the noted eighteenth century skeptic, are both recognized as significant contributors to the development of the ideas of classical liberalism, but politically both were affiliated with the Royalists/Tories. In Hume's case this only really comes out in his History of England. At any rate, excellent as many of Burke's "neo-Tory" insights in the Reflections are, conservatives would do better to look to his friend the lexicographer Samuel Johnson, the oft-quoted Dr. Johnson, as their eighteenth century prophet. T. S. Eliot was one conservative who recognized this, and his famous statement "I am an Anglo-Catholic in religion, a classicist in literature and a royalist in politics" consciously echoes Dr. Johnson's definition of a Tory.


- Canadian conservatism began as an adaptation of British Toryism. It was royalist, but, due to the greater denominational differences that have been here since before Confederation (French Canadians were predominantly Roman Catholic, English Canadians were traditionally English Anglicans and Scottish Presbyterians, with a sizable number of English Methodists and Baptists and Irish Catholics, and smaller numbers from other denominations) it was less associated with church establishment than its British parent, although it was far from being secular, and Canada, contrary to the claims of certain ignorant Grits, has no tradition of separation of church and state. Since the 1950s, and the birth of the American conservative movement (as recently as 1950 Lionel Trilling could write "In the United States at this time liberalism is not only the dominant but even the sole intellectual tradition"), Canadian conservatives have tended either to borrow ideas from American conservatives (Canadian neo-conservatives) or to emphasize the differences between Canadian Toryism and American conservatism and try to re-align the former with socialism, progressivism, and the left (Red Tories). Both tendencies are mistakes, in my opinion. Contrary to some clever arguments from the Reds and the examples of lovably eccentric individuals like George Grant and Eugene Forsey who were able to blend religious conservatism and the Tory love of Canadian institutions with otherwise left-wing views in their personal philosophies, there is no natural affinity between Toryism on the one hand and socialism, progressivism, and the left in general on the other. Canadian neoconservatives, however, have had the perverse tendency to pick out of the big tent of American conservatism, the ideas that are least compatible with our own Toryism and neglect those that are the most. That big tent originally consisted of classical liberals or libertarians (liberals in the nineteenth century meaning of the term), ex-Communist Cold Warriors, and traditionalists like Russell Kirk, Richard Weaver, and Robert Nisbet. The traditionalists borrowed from British classical conservatism as many ideas as they could compatibly incorporate into a liberal republic. Obviously, these are the American conservatives most compatible with our own Toryism. They are also the most neglected by Canadian neo-conservatives. This is perhaps not surprising when we consider how neglected they are in their own movement. Their role in the big tent was largely supplanted in the 1970s and 1980s by the New Right and (American) neo-conservatives. The New Right was an alliance between populist-nationalists and the Religious Right. There was some overlap in position between the older moral and social conservatism of the traditionalists which corresponded closely to that of British and Canadian Tories but the predominantly evangelical/fundamentalist Religious Right more often seemed to be a revival of Puritanism, the theocratic Calvinism that had been the first form of liberalism before it went secular, and the Tories' oldest enemy. The American neo-conservatives were New Deal, liberal, Democrats who defected from the left when the New Left became pro-Soviet and pro-Palestinian. These became the arch champions of American, neo-imperialistic, militarism. It is from the classical liberals and American neo-conservatives that Canadian neo-conservatives have borrowed the most. The Religious Right has had much less of an impact, perhaps because of the large influence of social justice theology on our evangelicals, although interestingly the socially and morally conservative George Grant, usually considered a Red Tory, was willing to look on the Religious Right as allies in the fight against abortion and euthanasia. With the election of Donald Trump to the American presidency, the populist-nationalists, with the backing of a sizable portion of the Religious Right, rose to ascendency in the big tent of American conservatism, much to the disgust of the Republican Party elite, an alliance of the neo-conservatives, classical liberals (except the Trump-supporting paleolibertarians), and a minority of the Religious Right. Already in Canada we see signs of this impacting us, with Doug Ford leading the Ontario Progressive Conservatives to victory on a populist-nationalist platform, and now Quebec having given a majority government to a party which, like Maxime Bernier's proposed new federal party, blends classical liberalism with populist-nationalism. What this entails for the future of Canada and Canadian conservatism remains to be seen. I will still be holding on to my classical, Canadian, Toryism with a willingness, as always, to entertain worthy ideas from any of these other varieties.

- The elements of genuine moral and social conservatism are the beliefs: a) in an unchanging and universal moral order or natural law with fixed standards of right and wrong (C. S. Lewis’ “Tao” from The Abolition of Man), b) that tradition, through which the accumulated wisdom of the past is passed down to us, is a more reliable guide to these standards than private, abstract, reasoning, c) that the cultivation and nature of right habits of behaviour (virtues) is more effective than the imposition of rules at producing right decision-making and that while the information transmitted in the process of cultivating such habits necessarily includes some rules, the bulk of it cannot be codified as rules and can only be learned from example, which is best accomplished in the home with the support of the teaching ministry of the church, and d) that the government’s role is the “ministry of the sword”, by which it makes and enforces the laws that uphold the peace, order, and justice that provide the civilized framework for all of the preceding points. The popular perception of moral and social conservatism, however, has largely been shaped by the New American Religious Right, the most immediate direct ancestor of which was the Prohibition movement which grew out of the Temperance Movement supported by evangelical and fundamentalist revivalists in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It is often forgotten today that Prohibition was considered to be a Progressive cause, both big and small p, at the time, and also had the support of the Social Gospel movement (theological liberalism) and first-wave feminism. Indeed, in Canada at least, the latter was largely responsible for Prohibition passing – the provinces generally voted Prohibition in immediately after feminism won the franchise for women in World War I and then voted it back out again once the men returned from overseas. While Prohibition did have its supporters among Conservatives, the most traditional Tories and the churches most associated with classical conservatism, the Anglican Church which at the time was still “The Tory Party at prayer” and the ultramontane Roman Catholic Church of pre-Quiet Revolution Quebec, opposed it. Stephen Leacock gave lectures against it pro bono public! There are significant differences, of course, between the Prohibition movement and the New Religious Right. The former sought to impose on society a new law, the complete abstinence from alcoholic beverages, which was not grounded in tradition, had not been part of mainstream Christian orthodox moral theology (it belongs rather to the Islamic tradition) and which, despite the best efforts of Rev. William Patton to prove otherwise, clearly contradicts the Scriptures. The latter was a response to a moral revolution that removed long-standing, traditional rules, which are supported by orthodox Christian moral theology. There is nothing in its opposition to abortion, euthanasia, and the ongoing sexual revolution with which genuine moral and social conservatism would disagree, but in its presentation it evokes the image of previous evangelical backed moral crusades, such as Prohibition and the seventeenth century Puritanism that would put a man in stocks for kissing his wife in public when he returned from a three year voyage on Sunday, an unattractive image to say the least.


- David Lane was a disturbed individual who rejected the Christian faith in which he was raised for a revived, Nordic, paganism and embraced a violent racialism and was eventually sent to prison for the crimes he committed as a member of the Order, a neo-Nazi terrorist group that supported its activities with funds obtained through armed robbery. Obviously a man who any sane person would consider to be utterly repugnant. What is interesting, however, is that if you take the "fourteen words" meme attributed to him, "We must secure the existence of our people and a future for white children", and substitute any other colour or racial identity for "our" and "white" you will end up with a statement that would be considered unobjectionable, non-offensive, acceptable, laudable, and even an essential goal of social policy by liberals, progressives, and other self-identified "enlightened" people. Make the substitution and you will see what I mean. This provides us with a challenge for the soi disant "enlightened." Either admit, that despite its unsavoury origins and associations, there is nothing objectionable in the content of the “fourteen words” meme or disavow all the other racial identity politics that you support.

- Another white nationalist meme is that of “white genocide.” It purports to explain the observable phenomenon that has sometimes been called “white death,” i.e., the vast shrinking, over the last century, of the Caucasian percentage both of the total world population and of the populations of historically white countries, that has accelerated after the post-World War II Baby Boom as white fertility has dropped and white populations have been aging without reproducing themselves, relying instead upon immigration to replace themselves. The explanation offered by the “white genocide” meme is that this is due to the plotting of some racial enemy. Although there certainly are leftists who express their hatred of white people in genocidal terms, an obvious example of which being Noel Ignatiev, and genocide would be an apt description of what is being done to the whites of Zimbabwe and South Africa, the phenomenon as a whole is probably better described as “white suicide.” The white nationalists are asking the wrong question. Instead of asking “who is doing this to us” they should be asking “why are we doing this to ourselves.” The answer is liberalism.

- Forty-five years ago, in the eerily prophetic novel, The Camp of the Saints, French author Jean Raspail warned of the coming death of Western civilization through an invasion of the masses of Third World poor aided and abetted by a suicidal white liberalism. The author was not a populist-ethno-nationalist, at least not primarily, but rather a traditional Roman Catholic and a legitimist royalist. Perhaps this explains his insightful prescience.


- Both the left and the right believe that ethnocentrism has both a healthy and a toxic form. Where they disagree is over what constitutes the difference between the healthy and toxic. The right would say that a healthy ethnocentrism is the kind of in-group loyalty that promotes and facilitates social cohesion, trust, and cooperation whereas toxic ethnocentrism is characterized by a paranoid distrust and violent hatred towards other groups. The left is more simplistic. For them it is a matter of skin colour. If you have the wrong skin colour, white, your ethnocentrism is toxic, no matter what form it takes, if you have the right skin colour, all others, it is healthy, even if it is expressed in paranoid and hateful terms.

- Today “enlightened” seems to mean “uncritically following the latest trends and fads in modern philosophy.” Come to think of it, that’s what it meant in the days of Diderot, Montesquieu, Voltaire, Kant and Rousseau, as well.


- Finding economic truth boils down to one question: who is the most competent to make the decision? If it is a decision that primarily affects the individual and his family, then the individual and family are under most circumstances the most competent to make the decision. There are obvious exceptions of people who lack the rational facility to make their own decisions, but for the most part this stands true. Conversely, if it is a decision that primarily affects the good of the country as a whole, the government is the most competent to make the decision. Again there are obvious exceptions, such as when the government consists of arrogant, egotists, obsessed with reading everything through the lens of the latest trend in progressive and politically correct ideology, but generally it is the case. The doctrine of laissez faire or economic liberalism is the error of thinking that the individual is competent to make all decisions (and that the common good of the whole country is thereby brought about through Adam Smith’s “invisible hand”). Socialism is the error of thinking that the government is competent to make all decisions, including those that individuals and families should be making for themselves. The latter is by far the worst error of the two, but they are both errors.


- When someone says "satire is dead" they generally mean that things so bizarre have been happening in reality that it would be pointless to parody them. Satire is dead, but for an entirely different reason - the widespread influence of liberal, progressive, and left-wing thinking. The left does not get satire, because the left is incapable of distinguishing between basic human imperfection and huge evils that demand immediate rectification. This is because they refuse to accept the basic Christian truth that human history, between the Fall and Second Coming, is the history of people with the fundamental flaw of Original Sin, and that perfection cannot be expected on this earth and in time. Therefore, their response to any perceived imperfection is "this is unacceptable, it must be smashed, crushed, destroyed, and replaced with perfection." The point of satire, however, is to help us live with our imperfections, by allowing us to laugh at them. The political, social, religious, and cultural institutions that make for the good and civilized life are not perfect, but they can never be perfect, so rather than smashing them, crushing them, and razing them to the ground, let us laugh at their imperfections, so that we can appreciate them, warts and all. This spirit is completely foreign to the progressive. This is also why the greatest satirists - Jonathan Swift, Samuel Johnson, Stephen Leacock, and Evelyn Waugh to give a few examples, have been Tories.








Saturday, November 5, 2016

Weighing Evils

Since the birth of the internet there have been certain memes which recur online once every four years when the Americans have their presidential election. Of these, one of my favourites is the “Cthulhu for President” meme. Cthulhu is an entity from the stories of H. P. Lovecraft, an early twentieth century writer of gothic horror and science fiction. An ancient space demon, described as a giant humanoid with a head like an octopus, Lovecraft’s Cthulhu lies sleeping in the city of R’lyeh somewhere at the bottom of the ocean awaiting the cosmic re-alignment in which he will awaken and plunge the world into madness, chaos and destruction. The slogan for his perennial mock presidential candidacy is “why settle for the lesser evil?”

This slogan and, indeed, the entire Cthulhu for president meme, pokes fun at the idea of voting for the lesser of two evils which is sure to be put forward by the supporters of at least one of the two actual candidates. The idea is that you ought to vote for candidate X, not because of the merits of candidate X, but because candidate Y is so much worse. It is indicative of just how bad the quality of politicians has become when you find this argument being invoked in every election by both parties.

This has been the case for at least two decades, if not longer, now. To be fair, it is the Republicans who have usually fallen back on the lesser of two evils theme for such less-than-spectacular candidates as Dole, Romney, and McCain. The Democrats tend to prefer their own variation of the theme which is to compare the Republican candidate to Hitler.

This year’s election has probably set a record for most uses and abuses of both of these themes. What is somewhat odd this time around is that the same person is the target of both. It has been no surprise to see the Democrats, and the left in general, try to portray the Republican candidate, Donald J. Trump, as the second coming of Adolf Hitler. What has been more unusual is that the same establishment Republicans who trotted out the lesser of two evils argument for George W. Bush twice, have been using it this year against their party’s own candidate on the behalf of the candidate of the other party. A recent example of this can be found in the article “The Conservative Case for Voting for Clinton” which recently appeared on the website of The Atlantic. The author is David Frum, son of legendary CBC interviewer Barbra Frum, brother of Canadian Senator Linda Frum, son-in-law of the late, great, Peter Worthington, founding editor of the Toronto Sun, and speechwriter/biographer of former US President George W. Bush. The title can only be regarded as something of a sick joke. Frum, whose emigration to the United States I have often said is our country’s gain and America’s loss, has been a thorn in the side of conservatives on both sides of the 49th parallel for almost three decades now. In Canada, he was not a traditional Tory, i.e., a defender of our British institutions and heritage against American political, economic and cultural imperialism. Nor was he a genuine right-wing populist of the mold of the original Reform Party and was constantly calling upon that party to abandon the social and moral conservatism that were its most genuinely conservative positions and adopt a blend of fiscal conservatism and social liberalism. In the United States he is neither a Burkean traditionalist of the Russell Kirk, Robert Nisbet variety, nor a true libertarian. His idea of a “conservative” would appear to be a corporate, internationalist, free-trader who believes in a global Pax Americana. Thirteen years ago, he had the gall to write a despicable article for National Review – which had the poor taste to actually publish it – accusing American conservatives like Pat Buchanan, Sam Francis, Charley Reese, and Bob Novak of being “unpatriotic” for having the prescience to see that the Bush administration’s plans for invading Iraq were foolhardy and would prove disastrous. Now, in an article that maintains that to “vote for Trump as a protest against Clinton’s faults would be like amputating a leg because of a sliver in the toe” Frum says of Hillary Clinton - the same Hillary Clinton who told an audience of Brazilian bankers that her dream “is a hemispheric common market with open trade and open borders” - that she “is a patriot” and that she “will uphold the sovereignty and independence of the United States.” Someone ought to buy this man a dictionary because it is apparent that he does not know the meanings of the words he uses.

How anybody could look at Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump and say that the former is the lesser of two evils is beyond me.

Compare the personality flaws of the two. Donald Trump is boisterous, vulgar, hotheaded, crude, and emotional. Hillary Clinton is cold, calculating, manipulative, and ruthless. Trump’s failings are those of a human being – Clinton’s are those of a robot programmed to act out Niccolò Machiavelli’s The Prince.

Now consider the past misdeeds of the two. Everyone is familiar with the accusations against Trump because – despite Frum’s feeble attempt to deny the overwhelming pro-Clinton bias of the media – they have been in the headlines and aired around the clock on all the major news networks for a month. One of these – claiming business losses against one’s income taxes – is hardly a misdeed, but something every rational person does, the alternative being to unnecessarily fork over to the government large amounts of your income. When the Clinton campaign and its disinformation arm, also known as the mainstream media, focus on matters like this it is not people’s moral outrage to which they are making an appeal but their envy. As for the far more serious accusation of being a sexual predator, while his behaviour can certainly be described as sleazy the attempts to spin it as worse than that bear all the marks of media fabrication.

Contrast that with Clinton’s long record of large scale wickedness. Hillary Clinton is the godmother of a family that makes the Gambinos, Lucianos and Massinos look like third-rate amateurs in comparison. All of this controversy over her private server e-mails is not just a matter of careless negligence with state secrets. The post-subpoena deletion of thousands of her e-mails, much like the disappearance of all those Rose Law Firm files pertaining to the Whitewater deal after the “suicide” of Vincent Foster twenty three years ago, was felonious tampering with evidence when the Clinton family was under investigation. Skipping over the details of Whitewater, which dates back to when Bill Clinton was governor of Arkansas, as Obama’s Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is accused of selling public office for personal profit. Under her secretariat the State Department made massive arms deals with governments that were known to be sponsors of the very jihadi terrorists the United States was ostensibly at war with – governments which happened to have made large donations to the Clinton Foundation – and awarded government contracts, in, for example, the rebuilding of post-earthquake Haiti, to friends of the Clintons who were also large private donors to the Clinton Foundation. For decades every time a Clinton has held public office – be it Senator or Secretary of State in the case of Hillary or President or diplomat in the case of Bill – their actions have served the interests of Wall Street financiers and corporate globalists, who have paid them back with six digit fees for speeches the transcripts of which have been kept from the public until – against the Clintons’ wishes – they were brought to light by whistleblowers recently.

Which leads us to the policies and platform of the two candidates. As Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton’s foreign policy involved the destabilization of regimes deemed insufficiently democratic, like those in Libya, Egypt, and Syria, and the support of rebel groups even if they happened to be Islamic jihadists such as the ones who established the Islamic State. The most hawkish member of the Obama administration, her belligerent confrontational attitude towards Russia – and her insane proposal of a no-fly zone over Syria – is likely to bring about the very head-to-head Russian-American confrontation that every American president from Truman through Reagan sought to avoid during the years of the arms race and MAD. Trump, by contrast, says that it would be a good thing if America got along with the Russian and Syrian governments, and concentrated on fighting their mutual foe in ISIS. Trump’s foreign policy is sensible – Clinton’s is sheer madness. Then consider that Clinton wants to bring into the United States record numbers of “refugees” from the parts of the world she bombed as Secretary of State and will continue to bomb as President. Any sane person can see that “invade the world, invite the world” is a recipe for disaster and, from her past record we know that she will attempt to deal with the terrorist violence that this imbecilic combination is sure to bring upon her country by increasing domestic surveillance, thus threatening the civil liberties of all Americans.

Add to this the facts that she believes that the ongoing slaughter of the unborn is a sacred right that must be protected, is certain to continue Obama’s policy of inciting anti-white, anti-cop racial violence of the sort that took place in Charlotte, North Carolina this summer, and will step up the Obama administration’s heavy-handed attempts to force traditional religious believers to conform to the dictates of progressive ideology, and there is only one conclusion to which any person capable of rationally weighing the evidence can come to. Those voting for Hillary Clinton will be choosing the greater evil. They might as well write in Cthulhu on their ballots.

Wednesday, January 27, 2016

A Question of Style and Substance

When William F. Buckley Jr., having assembled an impressive team of right-of-centre men of letters such as his eccentric Yale mentor Willmoore Kendall, ex-Trotskyist Machiavellian Cold War analyst James Burnham, and Austrian Catholic royalist aristocrat Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, launched his journal National Review in 1955, he declared in its statement of purpose that it “stands athwart history, yelling Stop”. Many, impressed by Buckley’s rhetoric but not by the magazine’s subsequent performance, especially since it has reversed itself on many of the positions it took in the 1950s and 1960s, have suggested that this should read “stands athwart history, yelling ‘slow down’”. Personally, I think that Buckley was somewhat misguided from the beginning and that a nobler purpose would have been to “stand athwart history, yelling ‘turn this sucker around, its heading in the wrong direction.’”

National Review quickly became the flagship publication of the intellectual wing of the American conservative movement which at the time was a loose, “big tent”, coalition of disparate groups and individuals united by their common foes: welfare socialism, International Communism at home and abroad, and the forces of social, moral, cultural, and civilization decay that had begun to manifest themselves in such forms as the sexual revolution and feminism. Many of the elements of this movement were actually liberals in the older, nineteenth century sense of the term, such as the economists of the Chicago and Austrian schools respectively, Milton Friedman and Ludwig von Mises. Others were conservative in the traditional sense of the term, including the aforementioned Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn and the other Catholic monarchists who had fled the Nazi and Communist occupations of Europe. There were also American born traditionalists who combined elements of traditional conservatism and classical liberalism. In the eighteenth century, the classical liberal or Whig statesman, Edmund Burke, had borrowed the arguments of the Tories, or classical conservatives, for tradition, order, and prescriptive institutions such as the British monarchy and established church, to defend these against the kind of fanaticism that had spawned the violence and destruction of the French Revolution. Russell Kirk, an American disciple of Burke’s, adapted these arguments into a defence of the liberal, republican, institutions of his own country, the United States.

Realizing that a movement needs to be united around something positive rather than merely a common set of enemies, National Review promoted an idea called fusionism, developed by one of its original editorial staff Frank S. Meyer as a synthesis of classical conservatism and classical liberalism that would defend tradition and freedom at the same time. At this point, lest anyone think that the title of my website is a nod to this idea, I should say that I chose “Throne, Altar, Liberty” as a title to advance a different idea – the idea that it is the traditional institutions of monarchy and established religion which provide the necessary foundation and context for personal freedom and that therefore it is and always has been the Tory, the champion of these institutions, who is the true friend of freedom and that he does not need to borrow from the vain philosophies of John Locke and J. S. Mill in order to be such.

Initially, National Review took bold and daring stands against the progressive liberal consensus that the rest of the media was trying to build on a number of hot button issues. It stood up for the Southern states when everyone else was seeking to pillory them, refused to jump on the Martin Luther King Jr. bandwagon, challenged the wisdom and justice of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, defended scientists and academics who did not doctor the facts about matters such as IQ to conform to the neo-Lysenkoism that had become official dogma, and poured contempt on international efforts to bully Rhodesia and Southern Africa into accepting black majoritarian rule. Over the years however, it seems to have toned down its rhetoric, watered down its message, and even reversed its position on a number of issues. On a number of occasions it has jettisoned writers and editors over controversial positions they have taken – examples include Joe Sobran on Israel and the Middle East in the early 1990s and Peter Brimelow and John O’Sullivan on mass Third World immigration in the late 1990s.

Sometimes the magazine supports a candidate in the primaries for an American presidential election – Barry Goldwater and Ronald Reagan as examples – and sometimes it does not. This year it has chosen to go the route of waging a campaign of opposition against a candidate, the candidate in question being Donald Trump. Last week it posted to its website an official statement from the magazine’s editors entitled “Against Trump”, giving reasons why they feel that conservatives should not support the Donald, as well as a symposium of several conservative figures, who for one reason or another are not in favour of Donald Trump.

Now, as a patriotic Canadian and a firm royalist who does not approve of republics and presidents, I do not, of course, have a proverbial dog in the fight that is the American presidential election. I do confess, however, to having greatly enjoyed watching from up north as Donald Trump has enraged the feminists, open borders liberals, anti-racists, and all the other more-enlightened-than-thou, politically correct, killjoys who are the bane of post-modern existence. Perhaps it is because of this that I am inclined to see National Review’s anti-Trump campaign as yet another example of the magazine’s lamentable decline from the cutting edge challenger of the progressive zeitgeist that it once was.

The editors’ argument against Trump could be summarized in the complaint that he is a populist rather than a conservative. This is true in itself, and the distinction is an important one, but it does not follow from this that conservatives ought not to support Trump. Conservatism seeks to preserve, protect, and pass on the valuable institutions and traditions that have been passed on from the past, whereas populism seeks to mobilize and harness discontent on the part of the populace with the powers that be. It is difficult to reconcile these two projects, and historically the conservative has wisely viewed populism with suspicion because of the great destructive potential of the forces it wishes to unleash. Nevertheless, the reconciliation of the protection of heritage with the giving voice to popular outrage is not impossible, and National Review need look no further than their late former publisher, William Rusher, for a man who successfully combined traditionalism and populist activism. Up here, the last decent man to serve as Prime Minister, John Diefenbaker, was another example. He was on the one hand a prairie populist, who spoke out on behalf of rural, small town and farming, communities and regions against the arrogance of the money and business interests in central Canada and on the other hand a Tory firmly committed to Canada and her traditional institutions, such as Parliament and the monarchy. Indeed, when a powerful elite makes itself the enemy of the traditions and institutions the conservative cherishes, he is forced into the position where he must join forces to some extent with populism.

Interestingly, the editors of National Review themselves provide, albeit unintentionally, evidence that this is in fact the present situation. They refer, in one paragraph, to the “permanent things”, an expression from T. S. Eliot’s The Idea of a Christian Society that Russell Kirk had borrowed to indicate the things which the conservative cherishes and guards. As examples of the permanent things they give “constitutional government, marriage and the right to life.” Leaving aside the fact that in recent years National Review has often seemed to treat these things as expendable rather than permanent, having posted less than a year ago a screed arguing for capitulation to liberalism on a major point touching the second of them, is there any serious doubt that the predominate elites in the United States and the rest of the Western world have aligned themselves against marriage and the right to life?

Now to the preceding argument it may be objected that Donald Trump is not campaigning on a pro-life, pro-marriage platform but on a nativist, anti-immigration, platform. This is true, but in answer to this objection I would respond, first of all, by observing that it is the same elites who have set themselves against marriage and the right to life who are the ones who believe in a world without borders, in exporting jobs to the Third World and importing workers from the Third World, and who cannot stand the thought of closing the borders to any group of people even if doing so is an eminently sensible and obvious thing to do from the perspective of national security. Secondly, I would argue that immigration is obviously another matter on which conservatives should join forces with populism.

As recently as one hundred years ago, there was broad agreement across the political spectrum that it was countries who let immigrants in rather than deciding after the fact what to do with immigrants who let themselves in and however many immigrants a country let in to meet her needs at the time immigration should not fundamentally change the character of the country. A little over half a century ago, when liberals across the Western world began to push for more relaxed immigration policies, they still gave lip service to the old consensus, arguing that their policies would not drastically change the character of their countries, while conservatives, most notably those who were the farthest thing from populist rabble-rousers such as classical scholar-turned-High Tory statesman Enoch Powell in the UK and award-winning Catholic legitimist novelist Jean Raspail in France, argued that it would, and that it should not be allowed to happen. Now that liberal immigration is so changing the character of our countries that it is too obvious to pretend that it is not taking place, the new liberal line of argument is “so what, you are a racist if you have a problem with it.”

That conservatives, of all people, should be opposed to policies that are radically changing the character of our countries, is something of which the present editors of National Review are clearly aware. They therefore do not argue for an outright open-borders position but instead complain that Donald Trump’s proposals are unworkable, his position irresponsible, and his rhetoric vulgar. Whether his proposals would work or not are a matter for discussion and debate, although I think the arguments that they would not are incredibly weak.

The question that remains is do the editors of National Review, agree in substance with the old consensus that it is countries who will decide who they let in, that they will decide according to their own needs, and however many they decide they will not allow the fundamental character of their countries to be changed by immigration, and merely object to the vulgarity of Donald Trump’s populist style? Or is it rather that they disagree with the old consensus, and are really open-borders, one-world, liberals who are using Trump’s vulgar style as a pretext in a desperate campaign against the first man in decades who seems capable of shattering the new, liberal, consensus?

Sunday, May 18, 2014

Edmund Burke’s American Prophet and Disciple

Russell Kirk, The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Eliot, Seventh Revised Edition, Washington, D.C., Regnery Publishing Inc., 1953, 1985, 535 pp., US$19.95

In Canada conservatism has been a form of political thought, a movement, and even a political party, from the very beginning. The foremost of the Fathers of Confederation, and the first Prime Minister in the first Canadian parliament of 1867, was Sir John A. Macdonald, leader of the Conservative Party. The traditional Canadian conservative was a monarchist, an Anglophile, a supporter of the British Empire and later the Commonwealth, who had old-fashioned social and moral views, was a Protestant, usually Anglican or Presbyterian, and was a pro-business economic nationalist. Until the 1960s, the province of Quebec was traditionally very conservative, although in a French and Roman Catholic sort of way.

In the United States, there was no conservative movement as such until after World War II. The reason for this should be obvious – the United States had been born out of a revolution led by men espousing liberal and in many cases radical ideas. The American revolutionaries used the word “Tory”, which was the name for the royalist traditionalist party prior to its nineteenth century reorganization under the name “Conservative”, as a term of contempt for the Loyalists who later became the first English Canadians. From its very conception the United States identified itself as a liberal republic. Even the American regions that were the most culturally, socially, and religiously conservative, were often very liberal – in the classical sense – politically. Thus Southern conservatism, which predates any type of national conservatism in the United States by well over a century, historically combines a defense of a Tory social, moral, cultural, and religious order, with that of a Jeffersonian liberal political order.

The United States developed a “Right” before it developed a conservative movement. This was in response to the changes that took place within American liberalism between the two World Wars. American liberalism was originally very individualistic and committed to the ideas of minimal government and maximum personal freedom. During the Wilson administration in the First World War American liberals, impressed with the ability of the state to administer and manage the national economy to meet its wartime goals, began to ask why the state could not do the same in peacetime to meet progressive social goals. The Great Depression of the 1930s gave them the opportunity to experiment along these lines and under Franklin Delano Roosevelt, liberal Democrats became Keynesian interventionists, government expansionists and centralizers, and the architects of the American welfare state. Those who continued to hold to liberalism in its classical form and were alarmed at liberalism’s drift towards statism were surprised to find themselves forced into the role of the reactionary, i.e., the advocate of the old, traditional, order – in this case the American liberal republican order – against progressive innovation. Thus the American Old Right, which included historians Charles A. Beard and Harry Elmer Barnes, social critics H. L. Mencken and Albert Jay Nock, journalists Garet Garrett and John T. Flynn, publisher Colonel Robert McCormick and Republican Senator Robert A. Taft, was born. Most of these continued to think of themselves as liberals, some calling themselves “true liberals” or “classical liberals”, although Mencken and Nock in acknowledgement of the position into which they had been forced began to refer to themselves as “Tory anarchists”.

One of the results of World War II, American entry into which the American Old Right had firmly opposed until Pearl Harbour, was a geopolitical realignment in which the United States became the dominant power in the liberal Western world which was now threatened by a Communist Eastern bloc headed by the Soviet Union. Since both superpowers had the atomic weapons their rivalry took the form of a “Cold War.” It was in the context of this Cold War, that William F. Buckley Jr. reorganized the American Right, forged out of an alliance between Old Right liberals, now called libertarians, defectors from Communism such as James Burnham, Frank Meyer, and Whittaker Chambers, Europeans who had emigrated to the United States and were either Catholic monarchists like Thomas Molnar and Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn or philosophical critics of modernity like Eric Voegelin and Leo Strauss, and Burkean traditionalists like Robert Nisbet and Richard M. Weaver. This latter group had begun to emerge immediately after World War II, beginning with the 1948 publication of Weaver’s Ideas Have Consequences, a short book that traced the moral and spiritual decay of Western civilization into the materialistic technolatry that made the development of the atomic bomb possible back to the nominalism of the thirteenth century. Although it is the ideas of the last two groups that most match those that have historically been associated with conservatism Buckley gave the name conservative to the entire movement he was putting together. His inspiration for doing so came from a book which was first published in 1953 under the title The Conservative Mind: From Burke to Santayana by a man of letters from Mecosta, Michigan named Russell Kirk.

Kirk had begun writing this book while studying at the University of St. Andrews in Fife, Scotland to which he submitted it as his doctoral dissertation. He had originally titled it “The Conservative Route”, but was persuaded by his publisher, Henry Regnery of Chicago, that a less pessimistic sounding title would be more appropriate. He was accused by his critics of having manufactured a long pedigree for a newly created movement but this does not do him justice. What Kirk was actually doing was tracing the influence of the thought of Edmund Burke in England and the United States – Canada alas is omitted – during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

By making Edmund Burke the founder of what he calls conservatism, Kirk was, of course, consciously abridging the tradition of conservative thought, which he acknowledged in his introduction where he gave his reasons for starting with Burke rather than earlier conservative thinkers like Bolingbroke, Hobbes, and Filmer, or even Hooker and Falkland. It is ironic, perhaps, to describe Burke as the father of conservatism, when he was a Whig (liberal) rather than a Tory through most of his Parliamentary career but he earned his conservative credentials with his Reflections on the Revolution in France. Burke’s friend, the lexicographer, moralist, and staunch Tory Samuel Johnson, in his Dictionary defined a Tory as “One who adheres to the ancient constitution of the state, and the apostolical hierarchy of the church of England, opposed to a Whig” and in the Reflections, Burke defends the constitution and monarchy of England , the Christian religion and the established church, against doctrines of the kind that had been turned against the monarchy, aristocracy, and Roman Catholic Church in the French Revolution. Whenever I read Burke’s Reflections I get the strong impression that Burke was writing, not only for himself, but for Dr. Johnson who had died in the decade prior to the French Revolution and could no longer speak for himself, even though Burke retained his admiration for the Whig revolution of 1688 and showed no hint of his friend’s Jacobite sympathies At the time Kirk was writing this book, Irving Kristol was still a liberal and had yet to define a neo-conservative as “a liberal mugged by reality” but the description would seem to fit the Burke of the Reflections to a tee. Thus, the line of thought starting with Burke that Kirk called conservative, might be more precisely called “neo-Tory”.

In the introduction, entitled “The Idea of Conservatism”, Kirk identified six canons of conservative thought. These are general principles, because Kirk insisted that conservatism is not to be thought of as an ideology, by which he meant a rigid formula for an ideal society. The canons, which are the most referenced part of this book, are as follows: 1) “Belief in a transcendent order, or body of natural law, which rules society as well as conscience”, 2) “Affection for the proliferating variety and mystery of human existence, as opposed to the narrowing uniformity, egalitarianism, and utilitarian aims of most radical systems”, 3) “Conviction that civilized society requires orders and classes, as against the notion of a ‘classless society’”, 4) “Persuasion that freedom and property are closely linked”, 5) “Faith in prescription and distrust of ‘sophisters, calculators, and economists’ who would reconstruct society upon abstract designs”, and finally 6) “Recognition that change may not be salutary reform”. (pp. 8-9) Although the fourth canon is something that liberals, or at least classical liberals, also adhere to these are a good, concise, summary of those basic conservative concepts that both a Tory supporter of kings and bishops and a right-leaning American republican could agree upon.

The longest chapter in the book is devoted to Burke, naturally, which focuses upon his defense of prejudice, “the answer with which intuition and ancestral consensus of opinion supply a man when he lacks either time or knowledge to arrive at a decision predicated upon pure reason” (p. 38), prescription, prudence and principle against abstract reason and innovation. What Kirk then presents in the following chapters is not an unbroken chain of thought from Burke to the mid-twentieth century, with each link directly connected to the one that precedes and the one that follows, but rather a collection of snapshots, arranged in a rough chronological order, of individuals and movements on both sides of the Atlantic that have adopted a Burkean stance in one context or another. Although his next chapter discusses the early American Federalists, and particularly John Adams’ defence of constitutional ordered liberty against egalitarian, democratic, populism, Kirk did not limit himself to statesmen and politicians. One chapter discusses conservatism among the Romantic poets, particularly Sir Walter Scott and Samuel Taylor Coleridge in his later years, who opposed Benthamite utilitarianism. Another chapter is devoted to Benjamin Disraeli, both as novelist and Tory statesman, and John Henry Newman the leader of the Oxford Movement, the catholic revival in the Church of England in the 1830s who eventually “crossed the Tiber” to become a Cardinal in the Roman Catholic Church. Newman was a strong intellectual critic of theological, ecclesiastical, social and political liberalism as both an Anglican and a Roman Catholic. By contrast, a convert to Roman Catholicism who gets prominent treatment, nineteenth century New England Transcendentalist Orestes Brownson, went through virtually every radical cause and idea imaginable, before finally settling down as a Catholic and a conservative.

The final chapters of the book focus on the retreat of conservative ideas in England and America in the late nineteenth century that the book’s original title alluded to, but they are not entirely pessimistic in tone. Various groups on both sides of the Atlantic began to rearticulate conservative ideas in the early twentieth century and Kirk discussed several of these, with a focus on the New Humanist critics Paul Elmer More and Irving Babbitt. One of Babbitt’s students at Harvard University went on to become a prominent Modernist poet and moved to England, where he became a British citizen and shocked the Bloomsbury Set intellectuals by converting to orthodox Anglicanism. This was T. S. Eliot who, in his capacity as director of Faber and Faber, published the British edition of the book. Eliot objected to the original subtitle on the grounds that George Santayana was not significant enough to warrant being placed on the level of Burke. Amusingly, Kirk’s response was to replace Santayana with his friend’s own name, which is why every edition from the second on has been subtitled “From Burke to Eliot” even though Eliot is only briefly discussed. It is from Eliot that Kirk borrowed one of his favourite phrases “the permanent things” and Kirk later wrote an entire book on the poet who became, not just a conservative, but a High Tory, calling himself a “classicist in literature, royalist in politics, and anglo-catholic in religion.”

The Conservative Mind has now reached the sixty-first anniversary of its first publication and Kirk is still honoured as a prophet by the American conservative movement, although the honour is mostly lip service. The American conservative moment was long ago taken over by those whose primary interest is a Pax Americana in which the United States uses its vast military might to spread liberal, capitalist, democracy throughout the globe. This is a concept that Kirk would have found appalling. As a young man he had been influenced by American Old Right figures like Albert Jay Nock who were noted for their opposition to military interventionism as an instrument of government expansion. He shared the horror of the Old Right and Richard M. Weaver over the barbaric atomic attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and at the end of the Cold War he joined Patrick Buchanan and the other paleoconservatives who argued that the time had come for America to bring her troops home and opposed the first President Bush’s plans for a New World Order to be policed by an America-led coalition of free countries and his intervention in the Iraq-Kuwait crisis.

Here in Canada, Russell Kirk and his magnus opus have never really been given their due by conservatives. The older type of Canadian conservative, the Loyalist and royalist Tory, often dismissed Kirk as an American liberal republican, and ignored how so many of the ideas he held dear such as Eliot’s “permanent things”, the Burkean concepts of prejudice and prescription, the idea of society as multigenerational and organic rather than contractual in the Lockean sense, were key elements in their own tradition. The newer type of Canadian conservative, who prefers the imported American brand of conservatism to our own domestic variety, shows little awareness of Russell Kirk and would probably wonder what his idea of established order and liberty, stemming from a living tradition with roots stretching back through medieval Christendom to Greco-Roman cultural and civilization has to do with lower taxes and economic deregulation.

It would probably do both Canadian and American conservatives much good to dust off this sixty year old conservative classic and give it a read.

Tuesday, July 31, 2012

One Nation


Part One: Disraeli

Does the following story sound familiar to you?

The setting is nineteenth century England in the time just before and after Queen Victoria’s ascension to the throne. The hero is the younger son of an aristocratic family who is persuaded by his mother to run for a seat in the House of Commons. The villain is the hero’s older brother, who has inherited the family title and estate, and who lives up to his reputation as the meanest, skinflint in the country. The heroine is a young woman who has been raised in a convent and is considering becoming a nun herself but who has temporarily returned to live with her father. Her father works in a factory for an employer who is honest and fair but is concerned with the plight of the working poor and has become a leader, along with his best friend, a journalist, of a movement that demands that the rights of the worker be recognized. After an encounter with these three in a churchyard one night, where they shared with him some of their ideas, the hero decides to live among them under an assumed name for a time before taking his seat in Parliament, so that he can see the conditions of the working classes for himself. Later in London, he becomes reacquainted with his friends under his own name. By this time, he has earned a name for himself in Parliament, as a champion of moderate reforms. In speeches to Parliament which receive wide circulation, he calls for government to redress the legitimate grievances of the poor, lest they be become fuel for the fire of revolution. Through these speeches he regains the trust of the heroine. Before finally marrying her, he rescues her twice. The first time it is from the hands of the law, when she is arrested alongside her father when he is accused of conspiracy and sedition. The second time it is from the hands of a mob which has grown out of the movement her father started but which is now beyond his control.

If the story is familiar to you then you have probably recognized it as Sybil, a novel by Benjamin Disraeli that was first published in 1845, and which is the second volume in a trilogy of sorts that begins with Coningsby and ends with Tancred. If you are not familiar with the novel then I have just spoiled the reading of it for you by giving away the plot. If it was the next item on your list of books to read then I apologize, although I am fairly confident such an apology is unnecessary. Most readers today seem to be more interested in books about teenage girls falling in love with bloodsucking re-animated corpses or boys and girls hunting each other down for the amusement of television spectators in a post-apocalyptic world. Of the Victorian era authors who are still widely read, Disraeli is probably the last in a long list including such notables as Charles Dickens, George Eliot, Thomas Hardy, Oscar Wilde, the Brontë sisters and William Thackeray. It is as a statesman rather than as a novelist that Benjamin Disraeli is most remembered, and his novels, especially the three mentioned above, are more often read today for the political views expressed within them than as works of literature.

Benjamin Disraeli was elected to the House of Commons for the first time in 1837, eight years before the publication of Sybil (seven before the publication of Coningsby). He was elected as a member of the Conservative Party which had been re-organized from the old Tory Party in 1834, following the passing of the Whig Reform Bill in 1832. Sir Robert Peel, the leader of the re-organized party, intended by the new name to show that the party now accepted the Reform Bill, which it had vehemently opposed as the Tory Party, as “final and irrevocable.”

Disraeli, who had ran as a Radical prior to joining the Conservative Party and who wished to bring the Radicals into the Conservative Party before they merged with the Whigs to form the Liberal Party instead, might have been expected to have favoured the new direction the Tory/Conservative Party was taking under Peel. He did not. He expressed his contempt for Peel’s vision in Coningsby and in Sybil eulogized the old Tory Party in these words:

But we forget, Sir Robert Peel is not the leader of the Tory Party…In a parliamentary sense, that great party has ceased to exist; but I will believe that it still lives in the thought and sentiment and consecrated memory of the English nation. It has its origin in great principles and in noble instincts; it sympathises with the lowly, it looks up to the Most High; it can count its heroes and its martyrs; they have met in its behalf plunder, proscription, and death. Nor, when it finally yielded to the iron progress of oligarchical supremacy, was its catastrophe inglorious. Its genius was vindicated in golden sentences and with fervent arguments of impassioned logic by St. John; and breathed in the intrepid eloquence and patriot soul of William Wyndham. Even now it is not dead, but sleepeth; and, in an age of political materialism, of confused purposes and perplexed intelligence, that aspires only to wealth because it has faith in no other accomplishment, as men rifle cargoes on the verge of shipwreck, Toryism will yet rise from the tomb over which Bolingbroke shed his last tear, to bring back strength to the Crown, liberty to the subject, and to announce that power has only one duty: to secure the social welfare of the people. (1)

In the late 1840s, Peel, who had become Prime Minister, sought to repeal the Corn Laws, which protected British farmers, and to introduce free trade. As with his position on the Reform Bill this was a reversal of a long-standing Tory position and an acceptance of liberal doctrine. He succeeded in repealing the laws in 1846. This brought his premiership to an end for he won with the support of Whigs and Radicals but without the support of his own party. It was at this time that Disraeli rose to prominence in the Conservative Party as one of the leaders of those who supported the party’s traditional position against the free traders.

Twenty years later, in February of 1868, Disraeli succeeded Edward Smith-Stanley, the Earl of Derby, as the leader of the Conservative Party and the Prime Minister of Great Britain. He was in office for less than a year, losing the general election later that year to William Gladstone’s Liberal Party. He remained Leader of Her Majesty’s Most Loyal Opposition during the Gladstone premiership until winning a majority in the 1874 election, after which he served as Prime Minister again for six years.

Throughout his career in the House of Commons, Disraeli helped to shape the Conservative Party’s response to the changes wrought by industrialization. The process of industrialization, whereby Great Britain was transformed from a primarily rural society with an agriculture based economy to a more urban society with an economy based on manufacturing, had begun in the eighteenth century and continued well into the nineteenth. The economic and social changes this process brought about were so extensive that historians generally refer to this period as the “Industrial Revolution”. These changes were a mixture of the good and the bad. This was to be expected. The Irish have a saying “there are no unmixed blessings in life” (2), although it would perhaps be more precise to say that the blessings in this life do not come without a cost. Industrialization brought about a considerable rise in the general standard of living of industrialized countries. Regarded in itself, this must be regarded as a blessing. It came however, with a heavy cost.

Industrialization meant that many products were now being produced on a much larger scale than before. One of the causes of industrialization was the application of science to production. New tools were invented and new techniques discovered that enabled people to produce larger quantities of goods in shorter periods of time. This kind of production was carried out in large factories and is called mass production.

The production of goods on such a scale meant that there were more goods to go around and that they could be sold at a lower unit cost. This was a large contributing factor in the rising general standard of living but it also contributed to social and economic insecurity. The lower prices made it difficult for smaller producers to compete and they tended to be swallowed up by larger companies. Labourers began to leave the security of rural communities in which they had family and roots to find jobs in the factories in large cities.

Whether or not a producer can make a living depends upon demand for the goods he produces. The demand for goods has always fluctuated but there is a more stable demand for agricultural goods, which have to be constantly replaced, than for manufactured goods. The transition from an agriculture-based economy to a manufacturing-based economy, therefore, meant a tremendous increase in the economic insecurity caused by fluctuations in demand. Furthermore, the scale on which manufactured goods were now being produced, meant that such fluctuations would be much sharper than ever before. When a decrease in demand led to a slowing down of production, large numbers of people could now find themselves out of work, and with nowhere to turn to having been uprooted from their traditional support networks in rural communities.

This increase in economic insecurity threatened the stability of industrialized nations. At the end of the eighteenth century, radicals in France had turned the middle and lower classes against their king, his queen, the aristocracy, and the Church, in a violent revolution that overthrew an ancient, orderly society and replaced it with chaos, terror, and bloodshed which culminated in the rise to power of a maniacal would-be world conqueror. In the nineteenth century the same kind of demagogues that had stirred up this strife in France were more than willing to exploit the grievances of workers who had been alienated from land, community, family and other traditional means of support and left entirely dependent upon employment in factories. Early in the nineteenth century the Comte de Saint-Simon, Pierre Leroux, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and others began to preach the doctrine of socialism, which called for the private ownership of property to be eliminated, for all things to be owned collectively by society, and for each member of society to be employed to the best of his ability. In 1848 a German economist living in London, would combine this idea with a theory of history in which successive revolutions by working classes against propertied classes would eventually lead to Paradise on earth, and in an influential tract, called for such a revolution.

Sybil, Disraeli’s response to the same conditions, was published three years before Karl Marx’s Communist Manifesto. The two responses display both the similarities which one would expect from two thinkers, commenting in the same time and place on the same conditions and the differences that one would expect to exist between a revolutionary and an avowed supporter of the ancient constitution of church and state. Sybil has the alternative title, The Two Nations, which comes from what is undoubtedly its most frequently quoted passage. In the eleventh chapter, just before the hero Charles Egremont sees the heroine and title character, Sybil Gerard for the first time, he has entered into a discussion with her father and his journalist friend which ends with the following exchange:

‘Well, society may be in its infancy,’ said Egremont, slightly smiling; ‘but, say what you like, our Queen reigns over the greatest nation that ever existed.’


‘Which nation?’ asked the younger stranger, ‘for she reigns over two.’


The stranger paused; Egremont was silent, but looked inquiringly.


‘Yes,’ resumed the younger stranger after a moment’s interval. ‘Two nations; between whom there is no intercourse and no sympathy; who are as ignorant of each other’s habits, thoughts, and feelings, as if they were dwellers in different zones, or inhabitants of different planets; who are formed by a different breeding, are fed by a different food, are ordered by different manners, and are not governed by the same laws.’


‘You speak of—‘ said Egremont, hesitatingly.


‘The Rich and the Poor.’ (3)

Disraeli’s depiction of the conditions of the Rich and Poor as being so different as to warrant referring to them as two alienated nations clearly bears a resemblance to Marx’s contrast between the conditions of the “haves” and the “have nots”. When reading the two, however, it does not take long for the far more substantial differences to become apparent. Marx identifies class, not just the real classes of his own day but class in general, as a cause of the misery and suffering he observes, and calls for a revolution to abolish class. Disraeli, on the other hand, believed that a harmonious relationship, including mutual respect and obligations between the classes, was an essential part of the traditional constitution he defended and that a breakdown in this relationship was the problem, not the existence of class itself.

The American conservative writer Russell Kirk commented on this contrast between the alternate visions of Marx and Disraeli, saying:

Either propounded a theory of classes. Marx insisted that warfare among classes is inevitable, in time must be catastrophic, and will end with the absorption of all classes into the proletariat, establishing a classless society. Disraeli declared that the real interests of classes are not inimical; that they are bound together in the nation’s welfare; and his aim in politics was the reconciliation of classes, reunion of the two nations of the nineteenth century, rich and poor, into one state—but this reunion a vindication and restoration of class, not its abolition. (4)

Disraeli was not a progressive or utopian who believed that misery, evil, and suffering were the result of flaws in the organization of society which could be eliminated by reform, revolution, government planning or gradual progress. He did see a connection between the specific misery he was observing in his own day and the gradual subversion, by the Whigs, of the constitution of church and state, the history of which, from the confiscation of church lands in the reign of Henry VIII to the Reform Bill of 1832, he traces in the third chapter of Sybil. (5)

The ideas Disraeli expressed in Sybil and the two other novels in the trilogy it belongs to became the basis of the interpretation of the Tory tradition that guided Disraeli when he served as Queen Victoria’s Prime Minister later in the nineteenth century. This kind of conservatism has been called “Tory democracy” because in Disraeli’s own Reform Bill, of 1867 (6), the Tories extended the vote, which the Whigs had given to the commercial classes in the Reform Bill of 1832, to the industrial working classes. For progressives with ideals such as “universal suffrage” and “popular sovereignty”, both bills probably appear as successive steps in the same direction. This is not how Disraeli saw it. The 1832 Reform Bill had appeared to be a death blow to the Tory party because by extending the franchise to the commercial classes the Whigs had seemed to have ensured for themselves a perpetual monopoly on power as those classes were largely aligned with the Whigs. Sir Robert Peel believed that the future of the Tory party lay in swaying commercial class voters away from the Whigs. His strategy for doing so involved reversing Tory positions on matters such as protectionism and moving the party’s ideas closer to those of the Whigs. Disraeli believed that the Peelites had conceded too much and had given up the principles and positions which gave the Tories their raison d'être. He therefore sought to build a support base for the Tories among the working classes.

In contrast to populist demagogues, who gather followers by preaching popular sovereignty and attacking the constitutional order, Disraeli was trying to gather support for the constitution among the people.

As Peter Viereck put it:

Disraeli in 1867 argued strongly for his bill giving the vote to urban workers. He based his argument not on a radical faith in innovations or a liberal faith in the masses but on the need for providing a broader base for the same old traditions of monarchy, constitution, established church. (7)

The Disraeli interpretation of the Tory tradition is also called “One Nation Conservatism”. This title is a direct allusion to the two nations of Sybil. As Prime Minister, Disraeli introduced a number of reforms designed to alleviate the misery of the lower classes. The basic idea of One Nation Conservatism was that such reforms, like the extended franchise, would rally the working classes behind the Tory Party, the traditional constitution, the Crown, and the Church, and prevent them from joining subversive, revolutionary, and socialist movements.

That the One Nation concept had as its goal, the security and stability of British society and the thwarting of revolutionary and socialist causes cannot be stressed enough, because there were many in the twentieth century and are still many today who point to Disraeli’s One Nation Conservatism in an attempt to give a conservative pedigree to the welfare state and contemporary left-wing, egalitarian politics. The “Wet Tories” who dominated the Conservative Party in Britain during the 1950’s, ‘60’s and 70’s and the “Red Tories” in Canada are examples of these. The “Wet Tories” supported the “post-war consensus” in which all parties agreed to accept the socialism and welfarism introduced by Clement Attlee’s Labour government in the 1940’s. The “Red Tories” supported the “New Canada” of social liberalism, welfare socialism, and political correctness which the Liberal Party under the leadership of Lester Pearson and Pierre Trudeau had sought to build in the 1960’s and 1970’s. Both groups laid claim to be the heirs of Disraeli’s One Nation Conservatism. Both groups were closer in thought and spirit to the movements Disraeli was trying to thwart.

Of Disraeli’s reforms, Robert Nisbet wrote:

[W]hen, after becoming Prime Minister, he introduced reform bills in 1874, they were hardly the stuff of popular welfare. They were mostly concerned with sanitation, and Disraeli’s own wry, self-mocking comment upon his ‘reform’ bills was: Sanitas, sanitatum, ominia sanitas. Beyond sanitation the bills concerned some shrewd redistricting of voters and contracts between employers and employees. (8)

Nisbet wrote this in the context of explaining how Disraeli, in neither thought nor practice, diverted from Edmund Burke’s position that charity and mercy, while an obligation upon all Christians, was not the province of the magistrate. He may have overstated his case. The bill concerning contracts between employers and employees was the Employers’ and Workmens’ Act of 1875, which provided for lawsuits against employers for breach of contract. The Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act of the same year decriminalized peaceful picketing and legalized trade unions. Disraeli also outlawed the employment of children under 10 and made education compulsory for the same. Referring to Disraeli’s reforms, Labour MP Alexander MacDonald remarked “The Conservative party have done more for the working classes in five years than the Liberals have done in fifty.” (9)

Nevertheless, Nisbet’s point that the Disraeli reforms do not add up to anything remotely resembling twentieth century welfarism is valid. In the decade after Disraeli’s five year premiership another aristocratic, right-winger, Otto von Bismarck, Chancellor of the new, united Germany, introduced social assistance programs, including social security pensions and a national health plan, for basically the same reasons Disraeli brought in his reforms. Even these programs, limited as they were, did not add up to twentieth century welfarism.

The difference between the two is not just one of degree, nor is it merely the fact that the social legislation of Disraeli and Bismarck was passed by men trying to strengthen and preserve their societies’ traditional institutions and constitutions whereas welfare state legislation was passed by men who wished to bring about radical change through progressive social engineering, although it is that. In the welfare state, the distinction between what a man is responsible to do for himself and his family and what the state is responsible to do for him is severely compromised, if not altogether obliterated. There are some things which must necessarily be provided by the state. Government is responsible for passing laws, enforcing them, and dispensing criminal and civil justice, by necessity of definition. Government is responsible for the administration of public property by necessity of definition, and some public property, such as highways and police stations, is publicly owned by necessity of convenience. There are other things which each man is responsible to provide for himself and his family. These include the basic necessities of life, such as food, shelter, and clothing, and luxuries beyond that. Government should never take over this responsibility from a man unless he is incapable of fulfilling it and has no other support network – extended family, community, church – to fall back upon. When government takes over those responsibilities from a man, in any other circumstances, it harms him more than it helps him, because it undermines his character, particularly his sense of duty or responsibility, and over the long run this hurts him more than his suffering from want will.

If a man is incapable of providing these things for himself, and if he has no other support to fall back upon, then government is responsible to provide at the very least the basic necessities for him and his family. The reforms Disraeli and Bismarck introduced were designed to ensure that their governments fulfilled that responsibility at a time when it was particularly necessary that they do so. The welfare states, of the twentieth century, however, have extended their social legislation and programs so far that they are doing the damage described above – the evidence is plain to see all around us.

One Nation Conservatism’s strength is that it made its social programs do the double duty of both providing for the poor and bolstering the strength of traditional institutions and the constitution. Its’ weakness is the dilemma of how to prevent such programs from growing into a welfare state that saps responsibility and undermines character.



Part Two: The Dominion

The One Nation idea has historically had a strong influence over conservatism in Canada. Unlike the United States, which cited liberal ideals in declaring its separation from Great Britain, Canada was founded as a conservative country, built upon conservative principles such as allegiance to royalty. The foremost among the Fathers of Confederation, Canada’s first Prime Minister, Sir John A. MacDonald was leader of the Conservative Party. MacDonald was a Conservative of the Disraeli school, although he became Prime Minister of Canada in the year prior to Disraeli’s becoming Prime Minister of Great Britain for the first time. Interestingly, not only were the two men’s ideas very similar, they also resembled one another in appearance.

The influence of the One Nation concept in Canada can especially be seen in three traditional Canadian conservatives – the dean of Canadian humourists, Stephen Leacock, the premier Canadian philosopher George Grant, and Canada’s last decent Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker.

Stephen Leacock had the rather singular distinction of being both a professor of economics and a humourist. He taught economics and political science at McGill University in Montreal but he is more often remembered for his volumes of humourous short stories, the first of which, Literary Lapses, was published in 1910, and the most famous of which, Sunshine Sketches of a Little Town, is now a century old (10). Leacock was a member of the Conservative Party and the Church of England in Canada, and was an outspoken supporter of such traditional Tory causes as the British Empire, Canadian nationalism, and the tariff.

In 1920, Leacock wrote a small book or a long essay entitled “The Unsolved Riddle of Social Justice” (11). In ancient Athens, Aristotle had raised the question of distributive justice in his Nicomachean Ethics. That question is simply this: how is a society’s wealth rightly distributed among its members? In the nineteenth century, theologians in the Roman Catholic Church asked the same question in response to the conditions of early industrialism, only now they called it social justice rather than distributive justice. Discussion of this question spread and in 1891 Pope Leo XIII decided that it deserved and required a papal response, which he gave in the encyclical Rerum Novarum. At the time Leacock wrote his essay the discussion of social justice was still largely an ethical discussion among theologians. Leacock tackled the question from the perspective of a professional economist.

His essay included an evaluation of two distinct answers to the question, that of liberal individualism and that of socialism. He found both answers to be lacking. The answer the liberal individualist gives is:

If there is everywhere complete economic freedom, then there will ensue in consequence a regime of social justice. If every man is allowed to buy and sell goods, labour and property, just as suits his own interest, then the prices and wages that result are either in the exact measure of social justice or, at least, are perpetually moving towards it. (12)

Leacock’s response to the liberal position consists of a refutation of the idea of the “fundamental equality of value” in which “each thing and everything is sold (or tends to be sold) under free competition for exactly its cost of production.” Leacock said:

This was the central part of the economic structure. It was the keystone of the arch. If it holds, all holds. Knock it out and the whole edifice falls into fragments. (13)

While that may have been true of the economic structure of liberal individualism as framed by classical economists like Adam Smith, it was not true of that framed by Austrian school economists like Carl Menger, and it would have been interesting to have seen what Leacock would have said in response to an equation of economic freedom with social justice on the grounds of the subjective theory of value. Leacock’s evaluation of socialism is much more interesting.

He began by distinguishing socialism the economic doctrine from the revolutionary violence that often accompanies it. “In its essential nature socialism is nothing but a proposal for certain kinds of economic reform”. As such, Leacock said, the law should have no quarrel with it and should only step in when criminal violence is involved. He then went on to say:

For in the whole program of peaceful socialism there is nothing wrong at all except one thing. Apart from this it is a high and ennobling ideal truly fitted for a community of saints. And the one thing that is wrong with socialism is that it won’t work. That is all. (14)

Even in his serious non-fiction writing Leacock’s ironic sense of humour was on display!

Why won’t socialism work? To answer this question, Leacock describes the utopian society American socialist Edward Bellamy had depicted in his novel Looking Backward:

Mr. Bellamy pictures his elected managers – as every socialist has to do – as a sagacious and paternal group, free from the interest of self and the play of the baser passions and animated only by the thought of the public good. Gravely they deliberate; wisely and justly they decide. Their gray heads – for Bellamy prefers them old – are bowed in quiet confabulation over the nice adjustment of the national production, over the petition of this or that citizen. The public care sits heavily on their breast. Their own particular fortune they have lightly passed by. They do not favour their relations or their friends. They do not count their hours of toil. They do not enumerate their gain. They work, in short, as work the angels.

Now let me ask in the name of sanity where are such officials to be found? (15)

At this point his indictment of socialism kicks into high gear. At every turn human nature will prevent socialism from achieving its Utopia. If the goods produced in a socialist society are distributed unevenly those doing the distributing will allot the larger share to themselves, if they are distributed evenly then people will be motivated to be idle rather than work. The state might solve the latter problem by outlawing idleness and forcing everyone to work. Commenting on this scenario, to which the idea of socialism logically leads, Leacock states that “Socialism, in other words, is slavery”. (16)

In the final chapter Leacock offers his suggestions as to a practical alternative to socialism and liberal individualism. He writes:

Put into the plainest of prose, then, we are saying that the government of every country ought to supply work and pay for the unemployed, maintenance for the infirm and aged, and education and opportunity for the children. (17)

The reforms and social assistance programs proposed by Leacock were far more extensive than those of Disraeli or even those of Bismarck for that matter. His proposals were inspired by the measures government had taken during World War I, which had ended a couple of years before the publication of his book, to ensure that the country’s economy supported the war effort. He reasoned that if government could raise taxes and pass laws to support something destructive like war, it could and should also do so in peacetime to alleviate human misery. In this his reasoning was similar to that of American liberal Democrat Franklin Delano Roosevelt, but the similarity does not extend further than that. FDR was sympathetic to the socialist Left, to the extent that he recognized the Bolshevik government in Russia in his first year in office, ordered the creation of propaganda glorifying the Soviet Union (18), and fawned all over the Communist dictator Stalin into whose greedy clutches he placed Eastern Europe and much of Asia. Leacock despised Communism (19) and his proposals arose out of a sense of justice combined with a fear of socialism on the part of a man who otherwise favoured private enterprise. (20) In this he clearly fell within the One Nation tradition of Disraeli.

George Grant was a philosopher and professor who taught first at Dalhousie University in Halifax, Nova Soctia, then at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario, then finally at Dalhousie again. He initially taught in the Department of Philosophy at Dalhousie, became Professor of Religion at McMaster, then finally joined the Department of Political Science at Dalhousie. He became well known throughout Canada in the second half of the twentieth century through his talks on CBC and through a number of books. Some of his books, such as Philosophy in the Mass Age were edited from the scripts of his CBC talks. The book for which he is most often remembered, however, Lament for a Nation, was written as a monograph.

Grant was the grandson of Sir George Parkin, after whom he was named. Parkin like Grant’s father, had been principal of Upper Canada College in Toronto. Leacock, who had taught at the school under Parkin was a family friend. If the humourist had any influence on the formation of the philosopher’s ideas, his biographer does not say, but Grant too was a Conservative in the One Nation tradition. “One cannot understand the Conservatism of Canada” he wrote, “without thinking of Disraeli”. (21) Grant’s conservatism crossed the boundaries of the three fields in which he taught, philosophy, religion, and political science, and indeed, those three fields merged into one in Grant’s thought.

As a critic of the Modern Age, Grant was a philosophical conservative, even a reactionary. This did not mean that he thought everything that was a product of modernity was bad – he was always careful to qualify his critique of technology, for example, by noting the benefits he and others enjoyed because of technology which had not been available to previous generations. It meant that he was critical of general trends which characterized the Modern or Mass Age that he saw as carelessly sweeping away much that was valuable from older, pre-Modern, traditions. For example, traditional restraints upon both the passions and the will of man, were being swept away. In an interview with David Cayley for CBC radio, he described the “emancipation of the passions” as being “absolutely central to modernity”. (22) It was a discussion of the sexual liberation movement and the papal response which had prompted the remark, but Grant explained that it was not just the emancipation of sexual passion but of greed and the passion for power in capitalism and modern politics as well. In the CBC talks which became his first book, Philosophy and the Mass Age, Grant explained how the concept of progress, the driving idea behind modernity, had arisen as a secularization of the Christian view of history in which history is conceived of as being under God’s direction and moving towards the Kingdom of God. In the concept of progress, man takes the place of God:

Nevertheless, in its moral connotation there is nothing more important to its understanding than to recognize how the Christian idea of history as the divinely ordained process of salvation, culminating in the Kingdom of God, passes over into the idea of history as progress, culminating in the Kingdom of Man: how Christianity’s orienting of time to a future made by the will of God becomes the futuristic spirit of progress in which events are shaped by the will of man. ( 23)

Thus the modern concept of progress is a removal of traditional restraints upon the will of man. Grant’s understanding of this was the basis of his criticisms of technology and empire, which were both recurring themes throughout his writings. Man, freed from traditional restraints upon his will, seeks to impose that will upon all of creation. Empire is the expression of the liberated will in pursuit of domination, technology, the synthesis of science with art, of knowing with making/doing, is the means of domination.

Grant’s criticism of empire might seem to be inconsistent with his stated political philosophy. Support for the British Empire was a key element of traditional Canadian conservatism. Traditional Canadian nationalists had sought to strengthen Canada’s position within the Empire and then, after the Statute of Westminster, had sought to strengthen her relationship with the other Commonwealth nations. This inconsistency is not as big as it first seems. It was fear of American imperialism, of the Manifest Destiny sort, that had led to Confederation (24) and American imperialism was inseparable from modern progress because the United States, as Grant pointed out in Technology and Empire, had no tradition that antedated the age of progress. Canada, ironically, is a younger country than the United States, having been established almost a century after the American Revolution. Canada, however, as Grant pointed out in the same book, was founded as a conservative country within the older British tradition which had pre-modern roots to draw upon, rather than as a revolutionary country in rejection of the older tradition.

In Lament For A Nation he explained this at length:

English-speaking Canadians had never broken with their origins in Western Europe. Many of them had continuing connections with the British Isrles, which in the nineteenth century still had ways of life from before the age of progress. That we never broke with Great Britain is often said to prove that we are not a nation but a colony. But the great politicians who believed in this connection—from Joseph Howe and Robert Baldwin to Sir John A. MacDonald and Sir Robert Borden, and indeed to John G. Diefenbaker himself—make a long list. They did not see it this way but rather as a relation to the font of constitutional government in the British Crown. (25)

Grant’s purpose, in writing Lament for a Nation, was to bewail the failure of the Canadian project. The incident which prompted this jeremiad was the defeat of the Diefenbaker government. Diefenbaker had refused to accept nuclear warheads for the Bomarc missiles stationed in Canada against pressure from the Kennedy administration to do so. To Diefenbaker the pressure from the American government had turned it into an issue of national sovereignty. The Liberals, with the support of the NDP and Social Credit parties, were able to bring down the Diefenbaker government in a vote of no confidence over the issue. It was not that Grant saw this incident as the cause of the collapse of Canadian nationalism but rather as its signifier. The causes Grant identified, were the collapse of British power in the first World War, and the fact that the entire course of history in the modern age was on the side of progress and against conservatism:

The impossibility of conservatism in our era is the impossibility of Canada. As Canadians we attempted a ridiculous task in trying to build a conservative nation in the age of progress, on a continent we share with the most dynamic nation on earth. The current of modern history was against us. (26)

In the progressive way of thinking a statement like the one above is an admission that one’s cause is both foolish and wrong. Grant did not think this way and he was at his most conservative when, in the midst of this talk of defeat, he declared, in defiance of the Whig theory of history:

I must dissociate myself from a common philosophical assumption. I do not identify necessity and goodness. (27)

Where Grant departed from the One Nation tradition was in his discussion of socialism. Disraeli had some sympathies with the Chartist labour movement, but the Chartists did not embrace socialism, and Disraeli’s entire One Nation philosophy was built upon the idea of convincing the working classes to support the constitution and the Crown instead of the radical socialist movements he hated. Grant, on the other hand, spoke positively of socialism. He brought up the subject of socialism in chapter five of his Lament For a Nation. After calling the United States the “spearhead of progress” he identified two groups that would object to that characterization for opposite reasons, Marxists and “American ‘conservatives.’” (28) He then proceeds to refute the Marxist position.

He begins by arguing that because Marxism teaches that in the future state of communism men will no longer be alienated, it must distinguish between a non-preferable state (alienation) and a preferable one (non-alienation) and so “Marxism includes, therefore a doctrine of human good” which means that “Marx is not purely a philosopher of the age of progress; he is rooted in the teleological philosophy that pre-dates the age of progress”. This is so because in modern thought “man’s essence is his freedom” and therefore modernism rejects “any conception of good that imposes limits on human freedom” but instead believes that “the human good is what we chose for our own good”, belief expressed more accurately by North American liberalism than by Marxism. Marxists believe socialism to be “a more progressive form of organization than state capitalism” because Marx taught “that when scientists had eliminated scarcity as the cause of greed and oppression, a society would arise in which the freedom of each to pursue his desires would not conflict with a happy social order” and so socialism “would create a society of freedom in the sense of the emancipated passions”. Marxists, however, are mistaken in this because “it is difficult to deny that greed in some form is a desire that belongs to man qua man” and therefore “to emancipate the passions is to emancipate greed.” (29) Following this line of reasoning he declares:

Yet what is socialism, if it is not the use of the government to restrain greed in the name of social good? In actual practice, socialism has always had to advocate inhibition in this respect. In doing so, was it not appealing to the conservative idea of social order against the liberal idea of freedom? (30)

This entire line of reasoning is absurd, although brilliant, and leads to inevitable conclusions which are fundamentally at odds with Grant’s own stated values. The argument that Marx held to a pre-modern concept of “the good” was incredibly strained, and its conclusion, if we take into consideration what the “teleological philosophy that pre-dates the age of progress” was, translates into the assertion that Marx, who was ethnically Jewish (albeit anti-Semitic) and religiously an atheist, was a Christian. His identification of absolute freedom from all limitations as the essence of the modern would be true if liberalism and modernity were one and the same. Liberalism, however, is only one side of the coin of modernity, and not only did Grant himself know this, he went into great detail about it himself a few paragraphs later when he turned from discussing Marxism to discussing American conservatism and said that at the heart of the American conservative’s argument that his country is conservative rather than progressive is “an interpretation of the history of political philosophy with which the present writer would agree”, (31) i.e., the interpretation that there were two waves of modern political philosophy, the first being the wave of liberalism including Locke, Smith and Hume, the second being the wave beginning with Rousseau that produced Marxism. If this interpretation is correct, and Grant agreed that it was, then this completely undermines Grant’s argument that Marxism is really pre-modern thought that misidentifies itself as being modern.

The answer to Grant’s question “what is socialism, if it is not the use of the government to restrain greed in the name of social good?” is that it is a revolutionary doctrine, invented not to bolster and support social order, but to overthrow it by inspiring envy, which is on par with greed as one of the Seven Deadly Sins (32). This is historically obvious. It was not conservatives, interested in preserving traditional order from the ravages of liberalism who thought up the doctrine of socialism, but revolutionaries who wished to tear that traditional order down, and if socialism insists upon order rather than unlimited freedom it is not conservative order, rooted in tradition and religion but the order of the totalitarian state. Conservatism supports order, to be sure, but not order of any kind.

The social order which traditional conservatives support limits freedom, but is not hostile to freedom. Freedom, after all, is a value, not just of modern liberalism but of pre-modern Christianity as well, as anyone who has read St. Paul knows. Grant himself was well aware of this and wrote:

Liberalism in its generic form is surely something that all decent men accept as good—‘conservatives’ included. In so far as the word ‘liberalism’ is used to describe the belief that political liberty is a central human good, it is difficult for me to consider as sane those who would deny that they are liberals. (33)

This makes his tortured reasoning about socialism seem all the more bizarre. It was not necessary to argue that socialism and Marxism , contrary to the way socialists and Marxists themselves conceive of their movements, are pre-modern, conservative forces, bolstering the traditional social order, in order to argue that large-scale, American corporate capitalism, was and is a force for radical change, the breakdown of tradition and order and progress. The latter argument, which is Grant’s main argument, is certainly true. His argument about socialism is unworthy of him and seems to be an example of the “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” style reasoning. His answer to American conservatism’s position, which followed immediately after, displayed much sounder reasoning. He argued, correctly, that American conservatives, like Barry Goldwater, were actually defending an older, republican form of liberalism against the more modern, progressive form. It is noteworthy, that he considered the defeat of Goldwater to Johnson in 1964 to have demonstrated the triumph of modern progressive liberalism over the older republican liberalism, and declared “The American election of 1964 is sufficient evidence that the United States is not a conservative society”. (34) That judgement is not consistent with his assessment of socialism.

The so-called “Red Tories” consider Grant to have been their prophet but Grant himself rejected that label. (35) Most people who call themselves “Red Tories” today, would dismiss the social conservative opposition to abortion and euthanasia which Grant championed as part of American “neo-conservatism”, as they would similarly dismiss the views on gender, race, and immigration which Leacock frequently expressed. (36) The Red Tory interpretation of Grant’s views, essentially reduces his thought to his position on socialism which, as we have seen, was not Grant at his best.

The last Canadian conservative in the One Nation tradition that we will consider is also the best Canadian example of tradition. John George Diefenbaker was the thirteenth Prime Minister of the Dominion of Canada. Born in Ontario, but raised for the most part in what is now Saskatchewan, Diefenbaker became a practicing lawyer first in the village of Wakaw, Saskatchewan, then later in the city of Prince Albert. He ran several times for the Conservatives, in both federal and provincial elections, and was even the party’s provincial leader for a brief time, but met with defeat after defeat. Then, in 1939, he was nominated the Conservative candidate for the constituency of Lake Centre. Early the next year, Prime Minister Mackenzie King asked for Parliament to be dissolved, and Diefenbaker won his first election. He set his sights on winning the leadership of the party and in December of 1956 was finally chosen as Conservative leader. In the summer of the following year, he became Prime Minister of Canada for the first time with a minority government, and in the spring of the year after that he won the largest majority election in the history of Canada. His government was reduced to minority status in the election of 1962, and defeated the following year, in the vote of no confidence that led George Grant to write Lament for a Nation.

In his memoirs, Diefenbaker described his political philosophy:

My conservatism was rooted in the traditions of Sir John A. MacDonald, of Disraeli, and of Burke. “A disposition to preserve and an ability to improve, taken together, would be my standard of a statesman.” So said Edmund Burke, and so did I believe. (37)

Diefenbaker as a traditional Tory was a strong believer in the monarchy, an economic nationalist who opposed free trade, and a churchgoing Christian (he was a Baptist). As with Grant and Leacock, his Toryism and his Canadian nationalism were intrinsically connected:

I believed in a Canada free from the directing influence of the United States—a belief that served emphasize my devotion to the Monarchy in Canada and to the Commonwealth relationship. Our institutional heritage and our Commonwealth citizenship gave Canada a uniqueness in North America vital to our preservation as a nation. (38)

One does not have to look hard to see the influence of Disraeli upon Diefenbaker’s thought. Indeed, it is evident in the very title of his memoirs, “One Canada”. This title refers to Diefenbaker’s vision of Canada, as a country whose traditions and institutions have the support of all her members, regardless of their particular standing. Diefenbaker thought of this in terms of race as well as of class. He wrote:

I have always considered the official policy of separating our country into various racial groups to be a curse on the realization of a united Canada. One Canada, one nation, my Canada, your Canada, cannot be a hyphenated Canada. (39)

This is a theme Diefenbaker repeatedly and repetitively expounds upon throughout his memoirs. He despised racial intolerance but there is a notable difference between his vision of “One Canada” and the official anti-racism imposed upon the country by the Liberal governments that succeeded him. Diefenbaker emphasized Canada’s British traditions and institutions, such as the monarchy and Parliament, as a national identity to which all Canadians, English or French speaking, whatever their racial or ethnic background, could be loyal, and he believed that to promote such loyalty de jure discrimination, would have to be done away with. The Liberals during the Pearson and Trudeau premierships, in contrast, sought to downplay Canada’s British roots and traditions, and instead promoted a doctrine of “official multiculturalism” that encouraged hyphenated Canadianism. Diefenbaker fought racial injustice by amending or eliminating legislation in which Canadians were treated differently because of their racial origins. The anti-racist liberals tried to eliminate “racist” thinking through name-calling, guilt-by-association, indoctrination in the media and the schools, and outright police state tactics.

Diefenbaker, in the true Disraeli tradition, believed in social legislation but hated socialism. In his memoirs he recalled a conversation he had with Arthur Meighen over old-age pensions, which the latter opposed and Diefenbaker supported. Commenting on their disagreement, he wrote:

I have always been opposed to socialism. I believe that we cannot accept in a country such as Canada any system denying to the individual citizen the courage and initiative necessary to the development of a great country. When a private citizen takes a chance in business or enterprise and loses, he loses. When the state makes a mistake, the taxpayer picks up the loss. There is a vast difference, however, between the state that denies the citizen everything except the right to pay taxes, and the state that denies a decent measure of social security for the aged, the afflicted, and the disadvantaged. (40)

Socialism on the one hand, and the complete absence of a government safety net on the other, are, in other words, two undesirable extremes. The question of how to steer the ship of state away from the Scylla of inadequate support for the needy without falling into the Charybdis of socialism remains the difficulty.



(1) Benjamin Disraeli, Sybil, Or the Two Nations, chapter XLVI. The quotation comes from the last two paragraphs of this chapter, which are found on pages 394 and 395 of Volume I of Sybil in The Works of Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield (M. Walter Dunne: London and New York, 1904).

(2) “Níl aon suáilce gan a duáilce féin”, which is more literally translated “there is no joy without its own sorrow”.

(3) This is found on page 93 in the edition cited in footnote 1.

(4) Russell Kirk, The Conservative Mind: From Burke To Eliot, Seventh Revised Edition (Regnery Publishing, Inc.: Washington, D. C., 1953, 1985 ) pp. 268-269.

(5) This chapter, entitled “The House of Egremont” gives the history of the Whig ascendancy as the background to the story of the aristocratic family to which the novel’s hero belongs. Russell Kirk summarizes the history, as told by Disraeli, on pages 269-270 of The Conservative Mind.

(6) Lord Derby was Prime Minister and leader of the Conservative Party at the time, Disraeli was his Chancellor of the Exchequer. Disraeli is credited with the bill because he introduced it and persuaded his party to vote for it. See Robert Blake, Disraeli, (Eyre & Spottiswoode, Ltd: London, 1966), pp 450-477.

(7) Peter Viereck, Conservatism: From John Adams to Churchill, (D. Van Nostrand Company Inc: Princeton, N. J., 1956), p. 42.

(8) Robert Nisbet, Conservatism: Dream and Reality (Transaction Publishers: New Brunswick, USA and London, 1986, 2002), p.71 Bold indicates italics in the original.

(9) Quoted in Viereck, op cit., p. 44.

(10) Ron Dart, “Bred In Our Funny Bone”, Anglican Journal, March 2012. http://www.anglicanjournal.com/nc/other/news-items/article/bred-in-our-funny-bone-10502.htmlRon Dart, who wrote this article about Leacock’s life, humour, and the Sunshine Sketches for the centennial anniversary of its publication is, in addition to being a professor at the University of the Frazer Valley in Abbotsford, an advisor to the Stephen Leacock Museum in Orilia, Ontario, where Leacock had his summer home, on which Mariposa, the little town of the Sunshine Sketches, is based.

(11) Alan Bowker, ed., The Social Criticism of Stephen Leacock, (University of Toronto Press: Toronto, 1973), pp. 71-145. This volume is part of the series “The Social History of Canada”, the general editor of which was Michael Bliss.

(12) Ibid, p. 89.

(13) Ibid, p. 97.

(14) Ibid, p. 119.

(15) Ibid, p. 128.

(16) Ibid, p. 131.

(17) Ibid, p. 140.

(18) http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0036166/

(19) Gerald Lynch, in his afterword to the 1989 reprint of the McLelland & Stewart edition of Leacock’s 1914 Arcadian Adventures with the Idle Rich quotes the humourist as having said “This socialism, this communism, would work only in Heaven where they don’t need it, or in hell where they already have it.”

(20) Ralph L. Curry, Stephen Leacock: Humorist and Humanist (Doubleday & Company: Garden City, New York, 1959), pp. 141-142, 346.

(21) Globe and Mail, 1982.

(22) David Cayley, George Grant in Conversation (Anansi Press: Concord, 1995) , p. 156.

(23) George Grant, Philosophy in the Mass Age (University of Toronto Press: Toronto, 1995), p. 44, the original edition was published in 1959 by Copp Clark Publishing.

(24) Gerry T. Neal, “Canadian Nationalism”, July 1, 2012, http://thronealtarliberty.blogspot.ca/2012/07/canadian-nationalism.html , see “Part Two: The Two Canadian Nationalisms”.

(25) George Grant, Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism (Carleton University Press: Ottawa, 1965, 1989) p. 71-72.

(26) Ibid. p. 68.

(27) Ibid, p. 88.

(28) The scare quotes are Grant’s. He was referring to the kind of American conservative whose conservatism consists primarily of support for free-market capitalism, i.e., liberalism. While Grant does discuss the ideas of conservative intellectuals from Europe, such as Eric Voegelin and Leo Strauss who became involved in the American conservative movement, I do not recall seeing him ever refer to Russell Kirk, Robert Nisbet, Peter Viereck, or Richard Weaver. These men were the leaders of the “traditionalist” wing of the American conservative movement. They supported private enterprise and rejected socialism but this was never their focus. They looked to the same British conservatives – Johnson, Burke, Disraeli – that traditional Canadian conservatives look to for inspiration, and their views of the Modern Age, progress, and technology were quite similar to Grant’s.

(29) Lament For a Nation, p. 56-59.

(30) Ibid, p. 59.

(31) Ibid, p. 60. Grant includes a footnote referring his reader to Leo Strauss’s Natural Right and History for a detailed rendition of this interpretation of political history. Like Grant, I agree with Strauss’ interpretation. Grant was a great admirer of Strauss. His biographer William Christian writes that Strauss “was one of the most important formative influences on Grant’s thought”. William Christian, George Grant A Biography (University of Toronto Press: Toronto, 1993), p. 223. Strauss opened Grant’s eyes to the flaws in Hegel’s philosophy and the two corresponded. Grant went to meet Strauss in Annapolis in 1972, a year before Strauss’s death. (Christian, pp. 292-293) Ironically, among American conservatives, Strauss’ influence is nowhere greater than among the “neo-conservatives”, i.e., members of the “New York Intellectuals” group who had began as Cold War liberals then moved to the right in the 1970’s after the rise of the New Left, and who are most noted for being ardent supporters of American militarism and imperialism, believers in a global Pax Americana of worldwide democracy and capitalism enforced by the United States military.

(32) “If Avarice is the sin of the Haves against the Have-Nots, Envy is the sin of the Have-Nots against the Haves”, Dorothy L. Sayers noted in her address “The Other Six Deadly Sins”, originally given on October 23rd, 1941. http://www.lectionarycentral.com/trinity04/Sayers1.html

(33) George Grant, English Speaking Justice, (House of Anansi Press: Toronto, 1974, 1985), p. 4.

(34) Lament For a Nation, p. 66.

(35) William Christian, George Grant A Biography, pp. 266-267. Christian writes “Indeed he had written to Conservative publicist George Hogan to say that what he most disliked in the general economic situation of North America was the concentration of power that was taking place in Washington, and that he would not have found it impossible, were he an American, to vote in 1964 for right-wing Republican candidate Senator Barry Goldwater, as he would also earlier have supported General Eisenhower”. He also notes, on page 292, that Grant welcomed the victory of Richard Nixon in 1968.

(36) The expression “American neo-conservatism”, as Red Tories and their overtly progressive allies use it, refers not just to the wing of the American right populated by militaristic ex-liberals like Irving Kirstol and Norman Podhoretz, but to American conservatism as a whole.

(37) John G. Diefenbaker, One Canada: Volume I, The Crusading Years 1895-1956 (MacMillan of Canada: Toronto, 1975), p. 140.

(38) Ibid.

(39) Ibid, p. 218.

(40) Ibid, p. 152.